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IN THE S·UPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAN T. ORR, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. ) 
CLEGG LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
INC., -a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 7658 
STATEMENT OF F.&CTS 
The plaintiff brought this action to recover from 
the defendant the sum of $1,495.00 together with interest 
thereon, for thirteen head of cattle which the plain-
tiff alleged were purchased by the defendant from 
plaintiff on the 5th day of January, 1949, and delivered 
by the plaintiff to the defendant on the same date, 
under the terms of a certain ·agreement between the 
parties herein, entered into on the 5th day of January, 
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1949, and a copy of whi~h agreement was attached to 
plaintiff's complaint and marked Exhibit "A" and 
by reference made a part thereof. 
The defendant filed an answer and cross complaint 
1n which defendant admitted the execution of the 
agreement, Exhibit "A" and made a general denial 
of the other material allegations of plaintiff's com-
plaint. As a further defense the defendant alleged 
that in accordance with the terms of said agreement, 
E:x:hibit "A" the parties gathered 86 head of cattle 
on May 14, 1949, 7 head of cattle on May 17, 1949, 
and 16 head of cattle on June 9, 1949, making a total 
of 109 head of cattle gathered from the open range. 
Defendant further alleged! that on the 9th day of 
June, 1949, the plaintiff delivered to the defendant 25 
head of s·aid 109 head of cattle, as leased cattle and 
as provided for by the terms of the agreement between 
the parties, Exhibit "A", and delivered the other 84 
head of said 109 head of cattle to the defendant and was 
then and there paid the sum of $'6,660.00, which together 
with the $3,000.00 ·cash paid at the time of the execu-
tion of said agreement constituted payment in full 
for such 84 head of cattle at the agreed price of 
$115.00 per head; that on the 6th day of July, 1949, 
there were delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff 
13 head of cattle and the plaintiff was then and there 
paid the sum of $1,495.00 by the defendant; that on the 
17th day of August, 1949, the parties gathered one 
cow and she was delivered to the defendant and the 
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plaintiff was paid the sum of $115.00 ; that at the 
tin1es when all three such deliveries were so made the 
brand of the plaintiff was vented on all cattle so 
delivered. Defendant further alleged that on the 1st 
day of iliarch, 1950, it tendered to the plaintiff an 
interest payment in the sum of $150.48 which payment 
was rejected by the plaintiff. 
Defendant alleges, by way of cross complaint, 
that between the dates of January 1, 1949 and April 
30, 1949, the defendant sold and delivered to the plain-
tiff 85 tons ·of hay of the reasonable value of $44.00 
per ton and for a total price of $3,740.00, and 12 ton 
of cotton seed cake at $100.00 per ton for a total of 
$1,200.00 and furnished services and labor of men 
and machinery to the plaintiff for the reasonable value 
of $1,025.00 and p-r,ayed judgment against the plaintiff 
for dismissal of his complaint and for judgment· in 
the sum of $5,965.00. Plaintiff filed an answer to this 
cross complaint and admitted the execution of the 
agreement, Exhibit "A" and denied the other mate-
rial allegations of the cross complaint. 
Trial was had, without a jury, and the phiintiff 
was given judgment against the defendant in the sum 
of $1,495.00, representing the value of 13 head of 
catle at $115.00 per head, together with interest thereon 
from January 5, 1949, together with costs in the 
amount of $45.40. 
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Thereinafter the defendant filed a Motion for a 
New Trial on the following grounds ; insufficiency of 
the evidence to justify the judgment; that the evidence 
herein is insufficient to support the findings herein by 
the court; that the judgment entered is against the 
law. The motion for a new trial was argued by coun-
sel for the parties and denied by the court and the 
defendant appeals. 
All italics are mine. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. That the agreement between the parties, Ex-
hibit ''A'' is an executory agreement to sell and not 
an executed agreement of sale and that title to said 
cattle remained in the plaintiff until delivery was 
made in June, July and August, 1949. 
2. That the evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings of the ·court as to Findings of fact, Sec-
tions two, three, four and five. 
3. That the judgment is contrary to the findings 
of the court, section six of the findings. 
4. The judgment is contrary to the law. 
5. Appellant's motion for a New Trial should 
have been gr.anted. 
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ARGUMENT 
THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
IS AN EXECUTORY AGREEMENT TO SELL AND NOT AN 
EXECUTED AGREEMENT OF SALE AND THAT THE 
TITLE TO THE PROPERTY INVOLVED REMAINED IN 
THE PLAINTIFF UNTIL DELIVERY WAS MADE BY 
THE PLAINTIFF ON OR ABOUT THE 15th DAY OF 
MAY, 1949, AS PROVIDED FOR BY THE TERMS 
OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ANY LOSS UP TO THAT 
TIMEl SHOULD BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SELLER: 
THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE PARTIES USED IN SAID 
AGREEMENT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND THE 
INTENTION OF THE PARTIES SHOULD BE DETER-
MINED BY THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE SAID AGREE-
MENT: THAT THE TITLE TO SAID CATTLE RE-
MAINED IN THE PLAINTIFF UNTIL DELIVERY ON OR 
ABOUT MAY 15, 1949, AND PLAINTIFF WAS RESPONSI-
BLE FOR THE FEED FOR SUCH CATTLE UP TO THAT 
TIME AS FURNISHED TO THE PLAINTIFF BY THE 
DEFENDANT, AND THEREFORE THE COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. 
Contracts involving the sale of personal property 
are divided into two classifications by the statutes of 
this state. They are classified as contracts to sell and 
contracts of sale. Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Title 
81, Chapter 1, Section 1 provides as follows: 
81-1-1. Contract to Sell and Sales. 
1. A contract to sell goods is a contract where-
by the seller argees to transfer the property 
in goods to the buyer for a consideration 
called the price. 
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2. A s,ale of goods is an agreement whereby 
the seller transfers the property in goods to 
the buyer for a consideration called the price. 
The text books on this same subject classify the 
contracts to sell as Executory Contracts and the con-
tracts of sale as Executed Contracts. In 55 C. J. page 
39, Section 6, we find these two types of contracts 
defined as follows : 
''An executed sale or executed contract to 
sell personal property exists where nothing re-
mains to be done by either party to effect ~ 
complete transfer of title to the subject matter 
of the sale. '' 
''An executory s,ale or an executory contract 
to sell is one under which something remains to 
be done by either party before delivery and 
passing of title.'' 
The Utah Court in Middleton vs. Ev,ans, 86 Utah 
396, 45 Pac. 2nd 570, decided in 1935, states as follows: 
"It is a well established rule of law that 
where the language of a contract is clear and 
unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to 
determine the intent of the parties from the 
language used by the parties in- the agreement.'' 
If we apply this rule to the present ease we find 
that the agreement, exhibit "A", clearly uses 
language which indicates and clearly establishes the 
fact that the parties intended to and did enter into 
an executory contract to sell and not an executed 
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contract of s·ale. In line twenty-four of page two of 
such agreement the contract reads as follows: ''all 
of said cattle will be gathered by on or about May 
15, 1949, and that all of said cattle will be sold to the 
Lessee (defendant) herein.'' In line thirty of page 
two it again states, "all of the remaining cattle will 
be sold to the Lessee (defendant) herein." This lan-
guage clearly indicates that there was something to 
be done, that is, that the eattle were to be gathered 
on or about May 15, 1949, and would then be sold to 
the defendant. The further defense of the defendant 
alleges that said cattle were so gathered and delivered 
to the defendant beginning with May 14, 1949, and 
the evidence sustains this allegation. Transcript pages 
70 and 71. 
In the case of Middleton vs. Evarns, cited above, 
the court states further: 
"Under section 81-2-1 no property in the 
goods is transferred to the buyer unless and 
until the goods are ascertained'' and 
''Section 81-2-2 provides that under a con-
tract to sell, the property in the goods is trans-
ferred to the buyer at such time as the parties 
to the contract intend it to be transferred" and 
''for the purpose of ·ascertaining the intention 
of the parties regards shall be had to the terms 
of the contract, the conduct of the parties, usages 
of trade ·and circumstances of the case.'' 
In applying this reasoning to the instant case it 
would seem certain that the cattle to be delivered and 
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sold to the defendant by the plaintiff would not be 
ascertained until they were gathered and delivered to 
the defendant on or about May 15, 1949, as expressly 
set forth by the terms of the ·agreement and that there-
fore no property would pass until that time and that 
any loss up to that time would be ·at the expense of 
the Seller, and in this case the plaintiff. The evidence 
clearly shows that no number was ascertained, as to 
any cattle sold and delivered to the defendant, until 
the months of May, June, July and August, and that 
the loss of the thirteen head, which is the basis of 
the suit of the palintiff, took place many months prior 
to the date of gathering and delivery in the month of 
May and thereafter. 
If in our present case we look to Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, Rule 2, under Title 81, Chapter 2, Section 
3, we find the following: 
''Where there is a contract to sell specific 
goods, and the seller is bound to do something 
to the goods for the purpose of putting them in 
a deliverable state, the property does not pass 
until such thing is done." 
It would seem clear that from the language used 
by the parties in the agreement, exhibit "A" that the 
seller had the obligation to gather, count, vent the 
brands on the cattle to be delivered on or about the 15th 
day of May, 1949, before title to the cattle would pass 
to the buyer, and that any loss up to that time would be 
on the Seller. 
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The court below found, findings of fact sections 
two and three that the defendant purchased the cattle 
in question at the time he signed the agreement on the 
5th day of January, 1949, and at such time went into 
constructive possession of said cattle and that the par-
ties intended that the defendant have possession of 
said cattle and that defendant feed them. 
The court further found, findings of fact section 
six, that the plaintiff refused to permit the defendant 
to spray said animals in the spring of 1949. This find-
ing would infer that the Seller still intended that the 
ownership was in him and that he had the right to 
exercise control over the property being sold. This 
refusal on the part of the plaintiff to allow the defend-
ant to spray said cattle in April, 1949, is sustained by 
both the testimony of the plaintiff and Howard J. 
Clegg, for the defendant. In further support of the 
contention of the defendant that title remained in the 
plaintiff until the actual delivery and payment made 
during June, July and August, 1949, is found in line 
ten, page three of the agreement, exhibit "A" between 
the parties which reads as follows; "title to said cattle 
shall remain in the Lessor herein until they are paid 
for by the Lessee.'' The Lessor is the plaintiff and 
the lessee is the defendant. 
In Ruling Case Law, Vol. 24, page 20, section 282 
we find the following statement of the law as to the 
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sale of personal property where it is contemplated by 
the parties that the property to be sold will be weighed, 
measured or counted at a later date. 
"The general doctrine seems to be that a sale 
of personal property is not contemplated while 
·anything remains to be done to determine its 
quantity, as by weighing, measuring, counting, if 
the price depends on this, unless this is done by 
the buyer alone, and there is no other evidence 
to show the intention of the parties that the 
title shall pass before the quantity or price is 
so determined. The reason for this is because 
ordinarily in such transactions it is the inten-
tion of the parties that the title and the cor-re-
sponding risk remains in the seller, until the 
price is definitely ascertained. Thus in the 
English case of Zagury v. Furnell (2 Campb. 
242) where several bales of skins (stated in a 
contract to contain five dozen in each bale) 
were sold at a certain price per dozen, but it 
was the duty of the Seller to count over the 
skins, to see how many each bale contained, and 
before so doing they were consumed by fire, 
Lord Ellenbourough and Sir James Mansfield 
held the loss to be entirely on the seller.'' This 
same rule is approved and applied in the case 
of Williams vs. Allen (Tenn.), 51 Am. Dec. 709. 
Other jurisdictions have many cases upholding the 
same rule of law as set forth immediately above. The 
Supreme court of Oklahoma in an old case, which 
seems to still be the law, decided in 1913, and reported 
in 132 Pac. 683 states the rule as follows: 
"The rule is that, if, under a contract for the 
sale of specific goods, the selled is bound to do 
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something to the goods for the purpose of put-
ting them in a deliverable state, that is, into a 
condition in which the buyer is bound to accept 
them, unless a different intention appears, the 
property does not pass until such thing is done; 
as where trees are to be trimmed, cotton to be 
ginned and baled, fish to be dried, crops to be 
gathered or threshed, cattle to be fattened, hops 
to be baled, machinery to be set up, or lumber 
to be sawed or planed, the doing of the thing 
is presumably or presumptively a condition 
precedent to the transfer of the property. In 
the case of an executory agreement, as the pro-
posed purchaser does not become the owner of 
the goods he cannot claim them specifically; he 
is not the sufferer if they are lost, cannot main-
tain trover for them, and has, at common law 
no other remedy for breach of contract than an 
·action for damages.'' 
Words & Phrases, Vol. 3, Page 32, states: Any-
thing short of passing title is not a sale, but an agree-
ment to sell. 
An illinois case wherein practically the same lan-
guage was used ·as was used in this case now before 
the court, to wit, agrees to sell and in our case, will be 
sold, states as follows: 
Windmiller vs. Flemming, 129 Ill. App. 476. 
''A distinction exists between sale and agree-
ment to sell, agreement to sell is merely execu-
tory and passes no title even in a distinct and 
specified chattel. The words agrees to sell are 
taken in ·ordinary acceptation of referring to 
the future." 
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The liability of the plain tiff as to the claim set 
forth in the cross complaint of the plaintiff will be 
determined when a final determination is made· as to 
ownership of the cattle at the time the feed was con-
sumed by the cattle. It is quite apparent that the 
responsibility for the feed as set forth in the cross 
complaint would rest upon the party owning the live-
stock to which it was fed. There 'seems to be no 
argument between the parties to the contrary. 
I res.pectfully sumbit that the judgment of the 
District Court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. EARL MARSHALL, 
Attorney for the Defendamt 
and Appellant. 
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